Sustainability has become paramount in society and retail. Therefore, this study aims to compare the environmental sustainability of brick‐and‐mortar retail and e‐commerce. A literature review identifies various factors, such as buildings, shopping trips, order bundling, returns, packaging, transport and logistics, and environmentally conscious behavior, that determine the channel that is superior in terms of environmental sustainability. While these factors are context‐specific and depend on several actors (e.g., consumers, retailers, and logistics service providers), most studies consider e‐commerce to be more environmentally (...) friendly than purchases from brick‐and‐mortar stores. However, this review demonstrates that most previous studies have focused on objective criteria (e.g., CO2). Therefore, to reflect the importance of consumers' perspectives on channel choice, we conducted four empirical studies that provide insights into the perceived environmental sustainability of each channel. In contrast to experts' views, consumers perceive e‐commerce as less sustainable than brick‐and‐mortar retailing. Hence, online retailers should improve their communication strategies and highlight the potential environmental advantages of e‐commerce and omni‐channel retailing. Brick‐and‐mortar retailers are advised to reduce the environmental damage they cause and encourage their customers to act in an eco‐friendly manner. (shrink)

Introduction: "I chose therefore my party & am a whigg": the First and Third Earls of Shaftesbury as political icons / Patrick Muller, Dresden -- Part I. The First Earl of Shaftesbury -- Whig wit: Andrew Marvell and the Earls of Shaftesbury / Nigel Smith, Princeton University -- Trade for peace: a complete account of the First Earl of Shaftesbury: interest in Carolina's Indian trade / Andrew Agha, University of South Carolina, Columbia -- John Locke and the reputation of (...) the First Earl of Shaftesbury / Mark Goldie, University of Cambridge -- Part II. The Third Earl of Shaftesbury in his time -- Shaftesbury, an early voice of the radical enlightenment / Jonathan Israel, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton University -- Shaftesbury and Locke: a tale of three letters / Daniel Carey, National University of Ireland, Galway -- "An equal commonwealth": Lord Ashley and the republican project of the late 1690s / Patrick Muller, Dresden -- Party politics in characteristicks / Jacob Sider Jost, Dickinson College, Carlisle -- Psychological and political balances: the Third Earl of Shaftesbury's reading of James Harrington / Laurent Jaffro -- (Re)defining the commonwealth: Shaftesbury's concept of political freedom / Angela Taraborrelli, St. John's University of Rome -- Shaftesbury's non-secular cosmopolitanism / David Alvarez, DePauw University, Greencastle -- Taste, the people and the public according to the Third Earl of Shaftesbury / Lawrence E. Klein, University of Cambridge -- Part III. The Third Earl of Shaftesbury: afterlife -- Art, morality and choice: the Third Earl of Shaftesbury and John Molesworth / William Molesworth, Dublin -- "Moral painting, by way of dialogue": Shaftesbury in the cry / Rebecca Anne Barr, National University of Ireland, Galway -- "Virtue pointing to her rugged mountain": Shaftesbury in America / James Pratt, University of Toronto -- Radicalizing sympathy: William Godwin's reading of Shaftesbury / Roman A. Barton, Humboldt-Universitat, Berlin. (shrink)

This richly textured book bridges analytic and hermeneutic and phenomenological philosophy of science. It features unique resources for students of the philosophy and history of quantum mechanics and the Copenhagen Interpretation, cognitive theory and the psychology of perception, the history and philosophy of art, and the pragmatic and historical relationships between religion and science.

Quantum mechanics has raised in an acute form three problems which go to the heart of man's relationship with nature through experimental science: (r) the public objectivity of science, that is, its value as a universal science for all investigators; (2) the empirical objectivity of scientific objects, that is, man's ability to construct a precise or causal spatio-temporal model of microscopic systems; and finally (3), the formal objectivity of science, that is, its value as an expression of what nature is (...) independently of its being an object of human knowledge. These are three aspects of what is generally called the "crisis of objec tivity" or the "crisis of realism" in modern physics. This crisis is. studied in the light of Werner Heisenberg's work. Heisenberg was one of the architects of quantum mechanics, and we have chosen his writings as the principal source-material for this study. Among physicists of the microscopic domain, no one except perhaps Bohr has expressed himself so abundantly and so profoundly on the philosophy of science as Heisenberg. His writings, both technical and non-technical, show an awareness of the mysterious element in scientific knowledge, far from the facile positivism of Bohr and others of his contemporaries. The mystery of human knowledge and human SUbjectivity is for him an abiding source of wonder. (shrink)

. How does the doctrine of double effect apply to business decisions to sell products which may be harmful to consumers? Lawrence Masek believes that some authors have misapplied the doctrine to this type of decision and, as a consequence, have committed themselves to placing unwarranted constraints on businesses. Seeking to correct this mistake, Masek presents his account of how the doctrine applies here, an account which is rather permissive but which, he claims, nevertheless preserves the virtues of the doctrine. (...) It will be seen, though, that his attempt to loosen these putatively unnecessary constraints by appealing to consumer autonomy and an intuition about the morality of producing harmful products leaves the doctrine of double effect irrelevant to this type of decision. His argument that the doctrine is less restrictive in this context than others suppose leads ultimately to the conclusion that the doctrine does not constrain this kind of business decision at all. (shrink)

A structural analogy is pointed out between a check hermeneutically developed phenomenological description, based on Husserl, of the process of perceptual cognition on the one hand and quantum mechanical measurement on the other hand. In Husserl's analytic phase of the cognition process, the 'intentionality-structure' of the subject/object union prior to predication of a local object is an entangled symmetry-making state, and this entanglement is broken in the synthetic phase when the particular local object is constituted under the influence of an (...) iota ('inner horizon') and the 'facticity' of the local world ('outer horizon'). Replacing 'perceptual cognition' by 'measurement' and 'subject' by 'expert subject using a measuring device' the analogy of a formal quantum structure is extended to the conscious structure of all empirical cognition. This is laid out in three theses: about perception, about classical measurement, and about quantum measurement. The results point to the need for research into the quantum structure of the physical embodiment of human cognition. (shrink)

Quantum-mechanical event descriptions are context-dependent descriptions. The role of quantum (nondistributive) logic is in the partial ordering of contexts rather than in the ordering of quantum-mechanical events. Moreover, the kind of quantum logic displayed by quantum mechanics can be easily inferred from the general notion of contextuality used in ordinary language. The formalizable core of Bohr's notion of complementarity is the type of context dependence discussed in this paper.

The aim of this dissertation is to develop a theory of hope which accounts for the two senses in which hoping is, or should be, practical. The first sense concerns the need to make hopes realizable, while the second captures hope's ability to sustain us and foster growth. My argument is that a pragmatic theory of hope, previously undeveloped, provides a compelling explanation of hope's practicality. In particular, such a theory emphasizes three dimensions of the life of hope--particular hopes, habits (...) of hope, and hopefulness--the interweaving of which accounts for hope's practicality. ;In the Introduction, I discuss the need for a practical theory of hope and then sketch key pragmatic ideas used throughout the dissertation. These include pragmatism's commitment to contextualism as well as the means-end continuum. In Chapters I and II, I discuss the first sense of hope's practicality, i.e., its realizability. I situate hope in the context of the human being as an interactive biological organism, highlighting the roles of intelligence and habits, as well as that of the self understood as the reconstructive dynamic of the organism. I then discuss particular hopes by focusing on their ends, understood as future goods which are arduous but nevertheless possible to realize. Chapter II focuses on habits of hope as the primary means to the realization of particular hopes. I consider three such habits, persistence, resourcefulness, and courage. ;Habits of hope also play an important role in the development of hopefulness. In Chapter III, I discuss the nature of hopefulness, contrasting it with despair and examining how it contributes to the second sense of hope's practicality. I argue that we can develop hopefulness as the regnant habit of the self, nurturing and sustaining us as we meet life's trials. The social nature of hopefulness is emphasized through examples drawn from Stephen King's "Rita Hayworth and the Shawshank Redemption" and John Steinbeck's The Grapes of Wrath. Both works show how hopefulness develops through close interpersonal relationships. ;Chapter IV closes the discussion by highlighting the conditioned nature of hope, pragmatically conceived. I consider alternate theories which focus on unconditioned hopes, but argue that these theories undermine hope's practicality. They transform its conditioned transcendence into an unconditioned transcendence, thereby undermining hope's realizability. (shrink)

Why a hermeneutical philosophy of the natural sciences? It is necessary to address the philosophic crisis of realism vs relativism in the natural sciences. This crisis is seen as a part of the cultural crisis that Husserl and Heidegger identified and attributed to the hegemonic role of theoretical and calculative thought in Western societies. The role of theory is addressed using the hermeneutical circle to probe the origin of theoretic meaning in scientific cultural praxes. This is studied in Galileo's discovery (...) of the phases of Venus; the practice of measurement; the different theories and practices of space perception; the historicality and temporality of scientific research communities which ground paradigm change; and the process of discovery. The paper draws particularly from the work of Heidegger. Though envisaging all science and scholarship, the highlighted theme is research in the natural sciences. (shrink)

Heisenberg, in constructing quantum mechanics, explicitly followed certain principles exemplified, as he believed, in Einstein's construction of the special theory of relativity which for him was the paradigm for radical theoretic change in physics. These were the principles of scientific realism, stability of background knowledge, E-observability, contextual re-interpretation, pragmatic continuity, model continuity, simplicity. Fifty years later, in retrospect, Heisenberg added the following two: a principle of non-proliferation of competing theories - scientific revolutions are not a legitimate goal of physics - (...) and a principle of tenacity - existing theories are to be conserved as far as possible. The conservative as well as the revolutionary potential of these principles is then discussed. A more penetrating philosophical criticism of these principles is postponed. (shrink)

The fundamental constants and initial conditions of the universe seem "finely tuned" for human habitation. The anthropic principle attempts to explain this fine tuning in terms of the eventual development of intelligent life. A closer look at the principle’s explanandum, however, reveals that it is teleologically and anthropocentrically biased. Our ignorance of the physical requirements of nonhuman forms of life forces the principle to be more unjustifiably anthropocentric and more speculative than is commonly admitted. Leslie’s, Barrow’s and Tipler’s attempts to (...) avoid an overly anthropocentric anthropic principle fail to solve these problems. (shrink)

IN A recent work I have attempted to show that visual space tends to have a Euclidean geometrical structure only when the environment is filled with a repetitive pattern of regularly faceted objects carpentered to exhibit simple standard Euclidean shapes, and tends to have a hyperbolic structure when vision is deprived of these clues. I conclude that visual perception--and by analogy, all perception--is hermeneutic as well as causal: it responds to structures in the flow of optical energy, but the character (...) of its response is also hermeneutical, that is, it has the capacity to "read" the appropriate structures in the World, and to form perceptual judgments of the World about which these "speak." The clues that are "read" perceptually as giving a Euclidean visual space are engineered objects, such as streets and buildings with repetitive architectural elements. These scientific artifacts of human culture belong to a family of readable technologies central to the phenomenological and existential-hermeneutical analysis of natural science. (shrink)

00 Drawing on the phenomenological tradition in the philosophy of science and philosophy of nature, Patrick Heelan concludes that perception is a cognitive, ...

Hermeneutics, or interpretation, is concerned with the generation, transmission, and acceptance of meaning within the lifeworld, and was the original method of the human sciences stemming, from F. Schleiermacher and W. Dilthey. The `hermeneutic philosophy' refers mostly to Heidegger. This paper addresses natural science from the perspective of Heidegger's analysis of meaning and interpretation. Its purpose is to incorporate into the philosophy of science those aspects of historicality, culture, and tradition that are absent from the traditional analysis of theory and (...) explanation, to re-orient the current discussion about scientific realism around the hermeneutics of meaning and truth in science, and to establish some relationship between the current philosophy of natural science and hermeneutical philosophy. The paper has particular relevance to the history and social studies of science and technology. (shrink)

This syllabus was submitted to the Rhodes College Office of Academic Affairs by the course instructor.

The structure of the universe and of most objects in it is determined by a small number of physical constants. It can be shown that only a limited range of values for each of these constants is compatible with the existence of human life. The fact that we are able to exist--but just barely--calls for an explanation. In the last fifteen years, an "anthropic principle" has been proposed as a possible scientific explanation of the fortuitous features of our world. This (...) type of explanation focuses on ways in which the presence of human beings guarantees that conditions in the early universe be suitable for the eventual development of intelligent life. In its strongest form, the anthropic principle is teleological: the universe is habitable precisely so that humans can evolve in it. ;Many issues surrounding the principle and its role in contemporary cosmology have been widely misunderstood by physicists and philosophers alike. My project is to clarify the nature of the principle and to criticize its value as a scientific claim. In chapters 1 and 2, I discuss the principle's historical background, and differentiate between several distinct ideas often misleadingly categorized as "anthropic." In chapter 3, after considering the principle's scientific justification, I conclude that it is neither essentially anthropic nor capable of predictive success. In chapter 4, I argue that the principle has little, if any, explanatory power, even in its teleological form. Having put fourth a number of criticisms of the principle as a scientific principle, in the final chapter I look at the possibility of construing it in a theistic context. Although the principle is not usually considered a religious principle, its resemblance to premises used in traditional theistic arguments from design suggests that it may be more defensible if thought of in a theistic context. (shrink)

Today when congressional committees are investigating laboratory notebooks, when the media debate the possibility of cold-fusion, and advertising presents drugs as remedies for everything from infertility to hair loss, the stage is set for the postmodern crisis of confidence in science. This crisis was ushered in by F. Nietzsche, and taken up by M. Heidegger, J. Habermas, Critical Theory, the Strong School of the Sociology of Science, by Margaret Thatcher, on the right and by Jacques Derrida, on the left—and, of (...) course, by the Greens. For so many intellectuals of the population, science has lost its legitimacy as uniquely privileged life-giving knowledge. The spirit of postmodernism in philosophy, as exemplified by Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, Lyotard, and many who claim to be hermeneutic thinkers, has turned against the "master narratives" of our culture which give legitimacy to the institutions of our society and has turned especially against the privileged status of modernist science which is central to this narrative. Since modernism dominates our society mostly through the success and prestige of formal and theoretical systems of codification allied with technical expertise, the most pressing problem for postmodernity then is coming to terms with science and its prevalent modernist interpretation. This is the problem I want to address. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

This syllabus was submitted to the Rhodes College Office of Academic Affairs by the course instructor.

This syllabus was submitted to the Rhodes College Office of Academic Affairs by the course instructor.

This syllabus was submitted to the Rhodes College Office of Academic Affairs by the course instructor.

This syllabus was submitted to the Rhodes College Office of Academic Affairs by the course instructor.

This syllabus was submitted to the Rhodes College Office of Academic Affairs by the course instructor.

This essay is dominated by three themes that recur contrapuntally in Heisenberg’s writings: observation, description, and ontology—prompted always by a concern about the role played by the subjective inquirer in scientific meaning-making, and by the ontology of scientific claims. Among the related themes are; the tension between paradigmatic concerns with structure and philosophical concerns with reality, the possibility of scientific revolutions, such as relativity and quantum mechanics, that can overthrow the classical traditions of natural science and the inadequacy of a (...) psychophysical parallelism for an epistemology of reason. The influence of Husserl and Heidegger is in his neokantian concern about the role of subjectivity. Heisenberg was a long-time friend of Heidegger and familiar with Heidegger’s hermeneutical phenomenology and its critique of Greek philosophy; he also contributed an essay to a Festschrift in Heidegger’s honor in 1959. (shrink)

Patrick Aidan Heelan’s The Observable offers the reader a completely articulated development of his 1965 philosophy of quantum physics, Quantum Mechanics and Objectivity. In this previously unpublished study dating back more than a half a century, Heelan brings his background as both a physicist and a philosopher to his reflections on Werner Heisenberg’s physical philosophy. Including considerably broader connections to the contributions of Niels Bohr, Wolfgang Pauli, and Albert Einstein, this study also reflects Heelan’s experience in Eugene Wigner’s laboratory (...) at Princeton along with his reflections on working with Erwin Schrödinger dating from Heelan’s years at the Institute for Advanced Cosmology in Dublin. A contribution to continental philosophy of science, the phenomenological and hermeneutic resources applied in this book to the physical and ontological paradoxes of quantum physics, especially in connection with laboratory science and measurement, theory and model making, will enrich students of the history of science as well as those interested in different approaches to the historiography of science. University courses in the philosophy of physics will find this book indispensable as a resource and invaluable for courses in the history of science. (shrink)

The classical notion of scientific objectivity is a property of propositional truth. It is the property of being open to testing and inspection, in principle, by all men, although in practice perhaps, the testing of a scientific claim is restricted to the members of a community of professional experts. It is, moreover, the property of being stable in time, true eternally as it were; for objective truth is thought to express what is so independently of human interests, initiatives, bias, social (...) circumstances and historical environment. Often there is the added connotation that what is so is pictured not in its relationship to man, but absolutely, as it were, in itself, or in its relations to the rest of nature, where nature is taken to have an essence independently of the meaning conferred on nature by Dasein. All this is expressed as truth-invariance relative to synchronous communities of knowers whether sympatric or allopatric : truth-invariance relative to allochronous communities of knowers, and truth-invariance relative to the physical transformations and substitutions which define the objective content of a scientific law or theory. (shrink)

Using the methods of hermeneutic phenomenology, and against the background of the principle that the real is what is or can be given in a public way in perception as a state of the World, and of the thesis established elsewhere that acts of perception are always epistemic, contextual, and hermeneutical, the writer proposes that objects of scientific observation are perceptual objects, states of the World described by theoretical scientific terms and, therefore, real. This thesis of Hermeneutical Realism is proved (...) by showing how the response of a standard instrument is 'read' as if it were a 'text'. Conclusions are then drawn about a number of topics, including Scientific Realism, Conventionalism, and Cultural Relativism. (shrink)